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INTRODUCTION 
The shootings by and against police officers over the last few years 
have raised numerous issues—political, social, and legal—on the 
relationship and interactions between officers and citizens.1 This Essay 
focuses on the criminal laws that govern these encounters. At first 
blush, their application seems noncontroversial. If a crime is 
committed, the individual—regardless of her status as police officer or 
citizen—should be held accountable. But it turns out that the actual 
crimes are different depending on the victim. 
If a police officer unlawfully harms a citizen, the officer is subject 
to assault or homicide charges—no different than if the officer 
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1. See, e.g., Julie Bloom, Richard Fausset & Mike McPhate, Baton Rouge Shooting Jolts a
Nation on Edge, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/18/us/baton-rouge-
shooting.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/95LQ-LT7Q]; Richard Fausset, Richard Pérez-Peña & 
Campbell Robertson, Alton Sterling Shooting in Baton Rouge Prompts Justice Dept. Investigation, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/us/alton-sterling-baton-rouge-
shooting.html [https://perma.cc/8YBB-ADET]; Manny Fernandez, Richard Pérez-Peña & 
Johnah Engel Bromwich, Five Dallas Officers Were Killed as Payback, Police Chief Says, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/us/dallas-police-shooting.html 
[https://perma.cc/6RSC-DCLW]; Matt Furber & Richard Pérez-Peña, After Philando Castile’s 
Killing, Obama Calls Police Shootings ‘an American Issue’, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/us/philando-castile-falcon-heights-shooting.html [https://
perma.cc/YAF5-SX3G]; Liam Stack, Video Released in Terence Crutcher’s Killing by Tulsa 
Police, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/20/us/video-released-in-
terence-crutchers-killing-by-tulsa-police.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/W5YF-ZGDE]. 
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committed these crimes off duty.2 However, if a citizen unlawfully 
harms a police officer, the citizen is automatically subject to aggravated 
assault or aggravated homicide charges, which carry more severe 
punishment.3 In fact, some states make the intentional killing of an on-
duty officer a capital offense.4 Enhanced charges in police encounters 
are thus asymmetrical. They only apply if a citizen harms an officer but 
not if an officer harms a citizen. 
States have similar one-sided aggravated charges when it comes to 
crimes against other employees performing public services such as 
paramedics, public-school teachers, and firefighters.5 The key in all 
these situations is that the victim was acting in her official capacity at 
the time of the crime.6 The rationale for these statutes is 
straightforward. It is imperative for states to deter individuals 
sufficiently from interfering with their ability to carry out state-
authorized functions.7 
  But police officers serve a unique role compared to these other 
public-service professions. Only their job authorizes the detention of 
citizens and the use of force—including deadly force.8 The inherent 
pressure of police action and the threat of physical harm—qualities not 
present in other public-service-oriented professions—suggest more 
tailored scrutiny of this activity that not only protects it but also 
prevents its abuse. 
Some states already have in place certain statutes targeting the 
misconduct of state actors. Dubbed “official oppression statutes,” 
these misdemeanor crimes are primarily designed to prevent abuse by 
public officials that may not otherwise fall under general criminal 
statutes.9 These statutes seem well suited to deter abuse or 
mistreatment by public-school teachers or firefighters who are not 
uniquely authorized to use physical force. But the greater authority of 
 
 2. See infra Part I.A. 
 3. See infra Part I.B. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05 (McKinney 2010); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a) 
(2016); infra note 55 (collecting statutes). 
 6. See supra note 5. 
 7. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 8. Soldiers also carry this authority, but, unlike police officers, these individuals are already 
subject to a separate set of criminal laws that are narrowly tailored to their unique duties and 
responsibilities. See Monu Bedi, Toward a Uniform Code of Police Justice, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 13 (analogizing police officers to soldiers and arguing that police officers too should be subject 
to unique criminal laws based on their authority and responsibilities). 
 9. See infra notes 17–24 and accompanying text. 
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police officers over citizens suggests something stronger is necessary to 
prevent abuse by these individuals, especially when something stronger 
is used to prevent harm against them. 
States should care equally about harms by and against police 
officers and their impact on state activity. Indeed, the recent (and 
seemingly consistent) news of police abuses—particularly against 
minority communities—only underscores the importance of effectively 
regulating police behavior in both directions.10 This kind of change will 
ultimately go a long way in helping to legitimate police activity in this 
context. 
Part I of the Essay discusses the asymmetry of criminal statutes 
when it comes to police encounters. Part II argues for aggravated 
criminal liability for crimes both by and against officers. It focuses on 
the expressive nature of uniform criminal laws and the concurrent need 
to regulate police behavior effectively. After addressing some potential 
(though unpersuasive) explanations for the asymmetry, the Essay 
concludes by suggesting remedial measures that may ultimately help 
restore confidence in police accountability. 
I.  ASYMMETRICAL CRIMINAL STATUTES IN PERFORMANCE OF 
POLICE DUTIES 
This Part describes the asymmetrical nature of criminal statutes 
that govern police and citizen encounters. Part I.A discusses how states 
handle harm caused by police officers and Part I.B focuses on the 
heightened punishment that applies when citizens harm police officers. 
A. Crimes by Police Officers 
Criminal law generally treats police officers the same way, 
whether they commit crimes on or off duty. The elements of relevant 
crimes such as assault and manslaughter make no distinction between 
these two contexts. These crimes typically require a specific mens rea 
together with some physical act resulting in injury. A simple assault, 
for example, requires a person to intentionally or recklessly cause 
 
 10. See supra note 1; see also Richard Pérez-Peña, Fatal Police Shootings: Accounts Since 
Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/08/us/fatal-
police-shooting-accounts.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/29F7-3TW4]; Stack, supra note 1 
(providing accounts of fatal police shootings since 2014 and noting a disproportionate number of 
African-American victims). 
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bodily injury to another.11 The charge can be increased in severity if the 
act results in severe bodily injury.12 Manslaughter generally requires a 
person to recklessly cause the death of another.13 Depending on the 
level of intent, the police officer may be on the hook for murder.14 
Recent indictments of police officers allegedly using excessive 
force bear this out. For example, in the Freddie Gray case in Maryland, 
the local prosecutor—in connection with the death of an arrestee in 
police custody—brought a number of general charges against a group 
of officers including manslaughter, murder, and aggravated assault.15 
Police officers can invoke special defenses on the use of 
reasonable force when their duties implicate potential criminal 
liability.16 This shouldn’t be surprising or problematic. Part of a police 
officer’s job is to make arrests and keep the peace. These duties 
necessarily implicate the potential of assaulting citizens, and, if 
necessary, killing them. None of this changes the fact that officers are 
still only potentially liable for the same crime as they would be if 
committed outside their duties. 
Some states also impose additional affirmative liability on police 
officers in the form of official oppression statutes.17 These are broadly 
worded laws that make it a crime for a police officer or other official to 
knowingly abuse her power.18 Deriving from the common law, these 
misdemeanors statutes historically have been applied to a wide range 
of police conduct, from the unlawful detention or mistreatment of 
 
 11. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00 (McKinney 2010); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2701 (2016); 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 12. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702; MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 211.1(2). 
 13. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2504; MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3. 
 14. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502; MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2. 
 15. See List of Charges Against Officers in Freddie Gray Case, CNN (May 21, 2015, 7:12 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/01/us/freddie-gray-police-charges/index.html [https://perma.cc/
SY3Z-ZG29]. The charges were eventually dismissed. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jess Bidgood, 
All Charges Dropped Against Baltimore Officers in Freddie Gray Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/us/charges-dropped-against-3-remaining-officers-in-
freddie-gray-case.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/QQF6-K65F]. 
 16. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 508(a); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07. 
 17. Roughly half of states have such statutes. See Matthew V. Hess, Comment, Good Cop-
Bad Cop: Reassessing the Legal Remedies for Police Misconduct, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 149, 183 
n.213 (collecting official oppression statutes). 
 18. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.00; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5301; MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 243.1. 
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citizens to extortion or other fraudulent acts.19 A typical statute reads 
in relevant part: “A person acting . . . in an official capacity . . . commits 
a misdemeanor . . . if, knowing that his conduct is illegal, he: (1) subjects 
another to arrest, detention, search seizure, mistreatment. . . .”20 The 
primary purpose of these statutes, however, seems to be cases of 
nonviolent abuse or verbal harassment—crimes that may not otherwise 
be covered by traditional criminal statutes.21 Nevertheless, these 
broadly worded statutes would sweep in any unlawful physical harm 
caused by police officers.22 For example, the prosecutor in the Freddie 
Gray case also charged the officers with official oppression in addition 
to the more serious assault and homicide charges.23 
The placement of these oppression statutes within typical criminal 
codes is revealing. These statutes are not part of the codes relating to 
crimes against persons—such as assault or homicide charges—but 
rather part of sections on offenses relating to public administration.24 
This placement may suggest that their primary function is to regulate 
state actors during the performance of their duties rather than to 
protect citizens from unlawful harm. 
B. Crimes Against Police Officers 
Physical harm against police officers is treated differently than 
physical harm caused by police officers. When the victim is a police 
officer, aggravated charges apply, which carry more severe penalties 
 
 19. State v. Lackey, 155 S.E.2d 465, 467 (N.C. 1967) (discussing common law origin of 
oppression statutes as misdemeanor crimes that apply when officer “while exercising, or under 
colour of exercising, his office he inflicts upon any person from an improper motive any illegal 
bodily harm, imprisonment, or any injury other than extortion”). 
 20. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5301. Federal law similarly has a broad general criminal 
provision that subjects police officers to liability if they deprive a person of a constitutional right, 
which can include physical harm. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012).  
 21. See Hess, supra note 17, at 183. 
 22. See Lackey, 155 S.E.2d at 467 (applying oppression statutes to assaults by officer). 
 23. See supra note 15. 
 24. Cf. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1084 (2015) (noting that a specific statute’s 
location within the overall federal statutory framework is relevant to a determination of its 
meaning). Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.00 (McKinney 2010) (under “Title L—Offenses 
Against Public Administration”), with N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120, 125 (under “Title H—Offenses 
Against the Person Involving Physical Injury . . .”); compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5301 (2016) 
(placed under “Article E. Offenses Against Public Administration”), with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§§ 2701, 2502 (placed under “Article B. Offenses Involving Danger to the Person”); compare 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 243 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (placed under “Offenses Against Public 
Administration”), with MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210–11 (placed under “Offenses Involving 
Danger to the Person”). 
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than general homicide or assault charges.25 These statutes are classified 
in a variety of different ways, including for example, “aggravated 
manslaughter,”26 “criminal homicide of law enforcement officer”27 or 
“assault on a police officer.”28 In some states, the intentional killing of 
on-duty police officers enhances a homicide charge to a capital 
offense.29 
It is important to recognize that these aggravated crimes 
contemplate the commission of the underlying assault or homicide. In 
this way, these crimes share the same elements as traditional homicide 
or assault charges, requiring a mens rea together with some physical act 
resulting in injury.30  The only difference is that these aggravated crimes 
include an additional element that the officer was acting in her official 
capacity at the time of the criminal act.31 Courts typically paint with a 
broad brush when determining whether a police officer was acting 
within her scope of authority.32 Some jurisdictions also require that the 
defendant know that the victim was a police officer.33 No additional 
harm, however, is necessary for the enhanced charge. 
The need for deterrence helps explain a key rationale for these 
aggravated statutes. Criminal laws generally seek to regulate citizen 
behavior by deterring or preventing individuals from harming one 
another.34 But harm to a police officer during an official encounter is 
more problematic than when similar harm occurs between private 
 
 25. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.11, 125.22; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2507, 2702.1. 
 26. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.22 (“Aggravated manslaughter in the first degree”). 
 27. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2507 (“Criminal homicide of law enforcement officer”). 
 28. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702.1 (“Assault of law enforcement officer”). 
 29. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(1) (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN § 18.2-31(6) 
(2014); Anthony Gosserand, “Protecting the Foot Soldiers of an Ordered Society”: An Analysis of 
State Statutory Aggravating Circumstances of Murdering a Police Officer in the Performance of 
His or Her Duty, 58 UMKC L. REV. 675, 681–94 (1990) (collecting state statutes that enhance 
murder of an officer in the line of duty to a capital offense). 
 30. See supra note 26. 
 31. See id.; see also infra note 62 (collecting statutes). 
 32. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Schwenk, 777 A.2d 1149, 1153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (finding 
that “a police officer may act in the performance of his duties even if he is not in uniform, and is 
not officially ‘on-duty’ at the time of an arrest”). 
 33. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2502, 2507 (2016). But see N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.11, 125.22 
(McKinney 2010) (stating that the defendant only needs to reasonably have known that the victim 
was a police officer); see, e.g., United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676–77, 676 n.9 (1975) (noting 
that knowledge of the identity of the police officer is not required under federal law for a 
defendant to be charged with assault against a police officer during performance of duty). 
 34. See generally Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal 
Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765 (2010) (discussing the history and contours of 
deterrence theory, which regulates citizen behavior through fear of sanctions or punishment). 
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citizens. Only in the former situation is a citizen interfering with a vital 
state-sanctioned activity—one that requires an officer to put herself in 
harm’s way. Accordingly, states have a special interest in meting out 
more severe punishment to protect police officers when they are 
carrying out these duties.35 
There may also be a retributive rationale for these aggravated 
charges, though its application depends on the specific circumstances. 
Retributivism focuses on the defendant’s culpability or degree of moral 
wrongfulness to justify criminal liability and the resultant sentence 
rather than the good consequences stemming from punishment.36 
Under this theory, a citizen who targets a police officer and assaults or 
kills her during the course of her official duties may be more 
blameworthy than if the individual targeted a private citizen. One may 
find that it is morally worse to assault a state employee sworn to protect 
others than a private citizen, thus justifying the enhancement. 
Intuitions may differ, however, if the individual is being questioned or 
detained by the officer at the time of the crime. The citizen may feel 
stressed or otherwise agitated given the circumstances. While this 
certainly would not excuse the behavior and the resulting criminal 
charge, it may reduce the relative blameworthiness compared with the 
first scenario. 
Police encounters may also give rise to the crime of resisting arrest 
or a related charge of preventing an officer from discharging her duty.37 
This kind of crime is separate from an aggravated assault or homicide 
charge. “A person is guilty of resisting arrest when he intentionally 
 
 35. See, e.g., Feola, 420 U.S. at 679–82 (discussing that the justification for the crime of assault 
against a federal employee includes protection of federal activities); Markus Dirk Dubber, 
Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 829, 958 (2001) (discussing the rationale for and the history of aggravated crimes 
in this context, and noting that “an act of disobedience against the state is an act of disobedience 
against a particular state official” and “the modern American state takes great pains to protect 
the authority, dignity, safety, and well-being in the broadest sense, of ‘its’ officials”). 
 36. See Monu Bedi, Contract Breaches and the Criminal/Civil Divide: An Inter-Common 
Law Analysis, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 559, 592–97 (2012) (discussing moral-based criminal theories 
by Jerome Hall, Paul Robinson, and John Coffee); John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & 
Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1068 (2009); Russell L. 
Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of ‘Just’ Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 
859 (2002) (“Essentially, retributivism justifies punishment based not on its consequences but 
solely because an offender deserves it.”); Regina A. Robson, Crime and Punishment: 
Rehabilitating Retribution as a Justification for Organizational Criminal Liability, 47 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 109, 119–23 (2010) (analyzing the historical reasons for punishment including, among other 
things, deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation). 
 37. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.30 (McKinney 2010); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104 (2016); 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
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prevents or attempts to prevent a police officer or peace officer from 
effecting an authorized arrest of himself or another person.”38 Some 
statutes explicitly require actual force here, whereas others do not 
make it an element of the crime.39 
In one way, these crimes stand as the natural analog to the 
oppression statutes described above because they too are classified 
under crimes against public administration rather than under crimes 
against the person.40  Only this time the aim is protecting the lawful use 
of state activity rather than curtailing its abuse. 
Aggravated criminal charges and resisting arrest may be brought 
together depending on the circumstances. If a person assaults an officer 
with the intent to prevent her from performing her duties, the 
individual could be on the hook for both crimes.41 However, a person 
may physically harm an officer while in the performance of her 
duties—an instance of aggravated assault—but may not have a specific 
intent to interfere with her official duties to justify a resisting arrest 
charge.42 In states where actual force is required for a resisting arrest 
charge, the two crimes may merge depending on the circumstances.43 
Aggravated charges against citizens who harm police officers thus 
seem to be a hybrid. On the one hand, these statutes seek to deter 
physical harm to police officers qua citizens (much like regular assault 
or homicide) and, on the other, they seek to deter interference with the 
state’s ability to exercise its lawful police authority (much like resisting 
arrest charges). 
 
 38. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.30. 
 39. Compare People v. Stevenson, 286 N.E.2d 445, 448 (N.Y. 1972) (not requiring force), 
with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104 (requiring force). 
 40. See supra note 37. 
 41. See People v. Chesebro, 463 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713 (App. Div. 1983) (finding that a defendant 
can be convicted of both assault and resisting arrest because “the former involves intentional 
prevention of the performance of a police officer’s ‘lawful duty’ while the latter is directed only 
at proscribing intentional or attempted prevention of ‘an authorized arrest’”). 
 42. See Taylor v. Connelly, 18 F. Supp. 3d 242, 263 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[T]he Court notes that 
resisting arrest is not a lesser included offense of assault in the second degree . . . .”); Chesebro, 
463 N.Y.S.2d at 713 (“It is theoretically possible to commit assault in the second degree as defined 
by section 120.05 (subd. 3) of the Penal Law without committing the crime of resisting arrest.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nelson, 305 A.2d 369, 370 (Pa. 1973) (stating that “[u]nder 
the instant facts, the assault and battery necessarily involved the act of resisting arrest, and the act 
of resisting an officer in making the arrest; hence, the offenses merged” and thus the defendant 
could only be sentenced for the assault and battery). 
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II.  INCONSISTENT CRIMINAL LAWS AND A PATH TO REFORM 
This Part expounds on the divergent messaging the asymmetrical 
statutes send about harm to an officer compared with harm by an 
officer and argues for the creation of uniform aggravated statutes. Part 
II.A distinguishes the role of police officers from other public 
employees when it comes to asymmetrical criminal laws. Part II.B 
suggests possible explanations for the current one-sided aggravated 
statutes but ultimately rejects them as unpersuasive. Part II.C argues 
that amending laws along the lines I suggest will have an overall 
salutary effect that will help deter instances of police abuse and, in the 
process, foster greater legitimacy of police activity. 
A. Divergent Messaging and Regulating Police Behavior 
Criminal law performs an expressive function.44 It signals to the 
community what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior and, in turn, 
serves an important socializing function.45 Symmetrical laws naturally 
send a uniform message. For example, the crimes of resisting arrest and 
official oppression, together, tell the community that interference 
against police action and abuse of it are equally harmful to society. 
However, if there is asymmetry in certain criminal laws—such as 
the aggravated criminal statutes discussed above—this sends two 
different messages to the community as to the gravity of the relative 
harms. One signal sent by aggravated statutes is that physical harm 
against a public official is more damaging to society than harm by a 
public official. This kind of asymmetrical messaging is not always a bad 
thing. It may serve a legitimate state end. Take the case of a citizen 
harming a firefighter, teacher, or other public employee who is not a 
police officer. A one-sided aggravated statute makes sense here. On 
the one hand, it is important for states to take additional measures to 
protect these employees from physical harm while they perform their 
public-service-oriented duties. On the other, because their state-
sanctioned authority does not implicate unique powers to detain or use 
 
 44. See, e.g., Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 
129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1504 (2016) (“The ‘expressive theory of punishment’ is well known [and] 
turns on noticing that punishment has expressive characteristics—that it is a kind of symbolic 
communication.”); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 
453, 476 (1997) (“Criminal law rules can contribute to normative forces; they can shape, alter, and 
guide those forces, but only if the community accepts the law as a legitimate source of moral 
authority.”). 
 45. See supra note 44. 
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force, regular assault or homicide charges together with oppression 
statutes (where available) seem adequate to address any reciprocal 
problem of abuse by these officials. 
But the double standard and resulting divergent messaging is less 
compelling in the context of police encounters. Police are uniquely 
authorized to question and detain citizens and use force and even 
deadly force. The dynamic between police officer and citizen thus 
necessitates coercion and the invasion of privacy—qualities that are 
not present in the consumer-like relationships with other public-service 
professionals.46 This suggests greater scrutiny of police conduct during 
these encounters over and above general assault or homicide charges. 
As it stands, police officers are able to use their powers without this 
increased attention to the risk posed to citizens. 
And the use of oppression statutes (assuming a state even has one) 
to make up the difference does not seem adequate. As misdemeanor 
crimes, they do not share the same deterrent effect or expressive 
function as aggravated assault or homicide charges.47 Moreover, it is 
harder to prove these charges because they typically require a knowing 
violation on the part of the officer.48 It is no surprise then that 
prosecutors rarely bring these charges.49 
The disparate criminal laws governing police encounters are 
particularly worrisome given the recent (and seemingly consistent) 
news of police misconduct. One needs only to read about the cases of 
Terence Crutcher, Philando Castile, and Alton Sterling, to see the 
severity of the problem and the need for reform.50 In a recent civil suit 
relating to police use of deadly force, Justice Sotomayor lamented the 
culture of police brutality and violence.51 Subjecting police officers to 
 
 46. See Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 
2186–87 (2014) (discussing police exceptionalism amongst other public services). 
 47. See Hess, supra note 17, at 187. For similar reasons, police manuals or department 
policies would also not adequately make up the difference. See, e.g., Bedi, supra note 8, at 29 n.115 
(“It is worth pointing out that these police manuals or department polices are outside the criminal 
justice system and thus necessarily do not have the same deterrent effect as criminal charges.”). 
 48. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. Federal prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 242 are also hard to prosecute since the officer must commit the violation with specific intent to 
violate a constitutional right. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107 
(1945) (finding that the prosecution must show that police officers acted with the purpose to 
deprive the victim of a constitutional right). 
 49. See Hess, supra note 17, at 186–88 (discussing the difficulty in prosecuting police officers 
under state oppression statutes and analogous federal law). 
 50. See supra notes 1 and 10. 
 51. See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 316 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“But the 
[officer’s glib] comment [after the shooting] seems to me revealing of the culture this Court’s 
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aggravated crimes may foster greater trust in police authority by not 
only showing citizens—and particularly minority communities—that 
states care equally about harm caused by police officers but also 
simultaneously deterring these instances of abuse through more severe 
punishment.52 If states care about these two issues (as they should) 
there does not seem to be a good reason why they should treat police 
abuse and protection differently. The ability of states to use resisting-
arrest or related charges—as an additional mechanism to protect lawful 
police activity—further underscores this point. 
It is worth noting that the argument for symmetry does not 
undercut or adversely impact a state’s legitimate interest in using the 
current aggravated statutes to protect officers from harm by citizens.53 
In other words, inserting a reciprocal aggravated statute targeting 
police misbehavior does not make it less likely that citizens will be 
deterred from causing harm during police encounters. The two statutes 
and their respective deterrent effects would work in parallel with each 
other, not at cross-purposes. 
B. Possible Explanations for the Asymmetry 
The above analysis assumes that these aggravated crimes seek to 
protect the official duties of an officer. Perhaps the asymmetry is better 
explained by shifting the focus away from the state activity at play 
toward the police officer herself. This interpretation is also consistent 
with the fact that these statutes are located in the section on crimes 
against persons. Under this reconceptualization, symmetry becomes 
less compelling because states certainly have (relatively speaking) a 
greater interest in protecting police officers than private citizens.54 
These individuals are performing a much-needed function and putting 
themselves at risk. As such, society must take additional precautions to 
protect them. 
This line of reasoning may have some persuasive appeal if identity 
alone were sufficient for an aggravated charge. It is not. Nearly all 
states require that the criminal act occur during the performance of an 
 
decision supports when it calls it reasonable—or even reasonably reasonable—to use deadly force 
for no discernible gain and over a supervisor’s express order to ‘stand by.’”). 
 52. See infra Part II.C. 
 53. See infra Part I.B.  
 54. Cf. Monu Bedi, Entrapped: A Reconceptualization of the Obedience to Orders Defense, 
98 MINN. L. REV. 2103, 2141 (2014) (arguing that the government has a greater interest in 
protecting against harms connected to it). 
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officer’s duty before triggering this enhanced charge.55 In other words, 
simply targeting a police officer who is off-duty or not otherwise in the 
performance of her duty would not trigger this enhancement. To be 
sure, a similar connection to official duties is necessary for aggravated 
charges in cases relating to firefighters, teachers, and other public-
service employees.56 This requirement in the end makes sense. A state 
has the most interest in the interaction at the point when the victim is 
actually working in her official capacity. Other instances of assault or 
homicide falling outside this narrow sphere are better regulated 
through general criminal statutes applicable to all citizens. 
This limitation may explain why some legislatures have now 
proposed hate-crime laws against defendants who target police 
officers.57 These kinds of statutes enhance an underlying criminal 
charge if the defendant targets a specific class of people because of 
some bias or animus toward the group.58 Traditionally hate-crime 
legislation has been used for crimes where the victim was targeted 
because of her race, religion, or gender.59 Today, many states have 
expanded these statutes to include sexual orientation and physical or 
 
 55. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-202 (2015); CAL. PENAL CODE § 243 (West 2015); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 612 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 784.07 (2016); IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1 (2016); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-5413 (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:34.2–3 (2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7 
(2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-210 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.481 (LexisNexis 
2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1 (West 2015); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.22 (McKinney 2010); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-102 (2016); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1114 (2012) (showing that the 
federal government requires the assault or homicide of a federal employee to occur during the 
performance of duty). Some statutes are more broadly worded to include acts occurring outside 
an officer’s official duties, but even here, the defendant must commit the harm to prevent, or 
otherwise in retaliation for, or on account of an officer’s performance of her duties. See, e.g., 720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.05(3)(ii)–(iii) (2016); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(1) (West 2016). 
It seems that these jurisdictions would also have equal interest in protecting citizens from unlawful 
harm by police officers acting in their official capacity as they do protecting officers from lawful 
harm by citizens on account of those duties. 
 56. See supra note 33. 
 57. See Rebecca Beitsch, Should Killing a Police Officer be a Hate Crime?, PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUST (Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/08/03/should-killing-a-police-officer-be-a-hate-crime [https://perma
.cc/A2G4-6HB6] (noting that half a dozen states are considering amending hate-crime laws to 
include police officers). Louisiana became the first state to add police to the list of hate crimes 
when it passed “Blue Lives Matter” earlier this year. See id. 
 58. See, e.g., Susan B. Gellman & Frederick M. Lawrence, Agreeing to Agree: A Proponent 
and Opponent of Hate Crime Laws Reach Common Ground, 41 HARV. J. LEGIS. 421, 422–23 
(2004) (discussing the nature of hate-crime statutes as targeting biased-based crimes). 
 59. See id. at 423. 
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mental disability, and some states have even expanded the scope to 
include age and political affiliation.60 
In the context of proposed police hate-crime statutes, these laws 
would trigger aggravated charges if a citizen intentionally targeted a 
police officer because of the officer’s status as law enforcement.61 
Whether the officer was actually in the performance of her duties at 
the time of the crime would be irrelevant.62 This kind of statute, as a 
result, may potentially apply more broadly than the current aggravated 
statutes protecting police activity. Proponents of this kind of hate-
crime legislation argue that it sends a strong message that the 
community stands behind police officers and cares about their 
protection.63 Some groups, however, argue that these statutes are 
unnecessary given the current enhanced charges already available if 
the offense occurs in the line of duty and also worry that including 
police officers would dilute the meaning of hate-crime legislation, 
which is designed to deter acts that intimidate whole communities.64 
This Essay does not take a position on these proposed hate-crime 
statutes. My focus is on current enhancement statutes that do not rely 
on identity and thus do not require specific animus against police 
officers. The relevant trigger focuses exclusively on whether the harm 
was caused during the performance of an officer’s duty. It is this kind 
of performance-based aggravated charge that I argue should apply in 
both directions. 
Retributive principles and the respective culpability of a 
defendant—either citizen or officer—do not readily provide their own 
justification for the asymmetrical enhancement during police 
encounters. Under this model, individuals would be punished more 
severely if they are more culpable.65 But much of this analysis depends 
on the underlying crime and relevant circumstances. Our intuitions can 
turn out to be the same in certain situations suggesting equal 
 
 60. See, e.g., Ben Gillis, Note, Understanding Hate Crime Statutes and Building Towards a 
Better System in Texas, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 210 (2013) (cataloging protected groups by state). 
 61. See Beitsch, supra note 57. 
 62. See id.; see also LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:107.2 (West. Supp. 2016) (establishing under 
Louisiana hate-crime law, selecting victim based on his status as police officer sufficient for an 
enhanced charge). 
 63. See Beitsch, supra note 57. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See, e.g., Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 
1757 (2012) (discussing a theory that links relative culpability of a defendant to the severity of 
punishment). 
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culpability. Take, for example, a citizen who shoots and kills a police 
officer while she is on patrol simply because the individual dislikes the 
profession. No one would disagree that this person is morally culpable 
and should be held accountable for aggravated homicide charges. Now 
assume a police officer while on patrol decides to kill a peaceful 
protestor because she dislikes the cause. Currently, only the first 
situation would receive a “performance of duty” enhancement.66 But it 
seems hard to distinguish these two cases on culpability grounds. Both 
individuals seem equally deserving of aggravated charges. One 
defendant harms a public official who is working to guard the 
community, and the other harms a citizen while duty bound to protect 
this individual. 
Things get murkier when the assault or homicide occurs in the 
context of questioning or detaining a citizen. Did the officer (albeit 
unreasonably) think the citizen was armed? Did the citizen (albeit 
unreasonably) believe the officer was unlawfully detaining or 
questioning her? These mitigating considerations—while not 
discharging criminal liability—would certainly impact any relative 
culpability analysis. My point is simply that a blanket aggravated 
charge in one scenario but not the other does not necessarily comport 
with our intuitive response as to which actor is more blameworthy and 
thus deserving of more punishment. Any compelling retribution-based 
analysis of the respective culpability of the individual will thus 
necessarily be case specific. 
C. Remedial Measures and Fostering Legitimacy 
Admittedly, there remains the question of remedial measures. 
Laws will have to be changed and I recognize this enterprise takes 
political capital and will naturally confront challenges. But despite the 
long odds of such a change being implemented, now may be the 
opportune time to introduce this reform given the groundswell of 
support and discussion regarding police reform.67 A symmetrical 
 
 66. This act could also subject the citizen to a potential hate crime. See supra notes 57–64 
and accompanying text. 
 67. See supra note 10; Joseph Goldstein & J. David Goodman, Criminal Justice Reforms Stall 
in a Liberal Capital: New York, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/08/22/nyregion/criminal-justice-reforms-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/DQ3X-W4RP]; 
Daniel Payne, Why We Need Police Reform, FEDERALIST (Aug. 20, 2015), 
http://thefederalist.com/2015/08/20/why-we-need-police-reform [https://perma.cc/Z22D-KZPE]; 
Maya Rhodan, Why President Obama’s Police Reform Is a Work in Progress, TIME (July 8, 2016), 
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system of regulating police activity will ultimately go a long way to 
legitimating police behavior in this context with the understanding that 
the laws apply equally to both parties.68 
I see two potential avenues for reform. A compelling argument 
can be made that after a general conviction for assault or homicide, 
sentencing—not the liability phase—is the better venue to decide the 
relevance of whether the harm was caused by or against a police officer. 
Sentencing allows a judge to weigh a host of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances that may not be relevant during the guilt-or-innocence 
phase.69 What was the exact nature of the police interaction before the 
crime occurred? How severe was the assault? Did the defendant 
commit a similar crime in the past? These are all questions that go 
beyond the elements of conviction but can be included in a sentencing 
hearing.70 
When it comes to physical harm by police officers, judges can 
consider the position of trust held by an officer as an aggravating factor 
during the sentencing phase of trial.71 This means judges can increase 
defendants’ sentences if they feel individual police officers abused their 
 
http://time.com/4398392/obama-police-reform-report-task-force-on-21st-century-policing [https:
//perma.cc/MVM6-KPXX]. 
 68. See infra notes 72–83 and accompanying text. 
 69. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 820–21 (1991) (“[T]he sentencing authority has 
always been free to consider a wide range of relevant material.”); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 
241 (1949) (discussing how sentencing judges mete out individualized punishment that takes into 
account all the circumstances surrounding crime and defendant’s history); Carissa Byrne Hessick 
& F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 52 
(2011) (“Judges modified sentences based on the particular facts [of] the crime, such as harm . . . 
or the defendant’s motive[,] . . . facts about the offender himself, such as any previous convictions, 
employment history, family ties, educational level, military service or charitable activities, and the 
defendant’s age.”). The extent of judicial discretion obviously varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved 
Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1196–1206 (2005) (discussing the various ways states 
have drafted sentencing guidelines). 
 70. See supra note 69. 
 71. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535(2)(n) (2015) (noting as aggravating 
sentencing factor the fact that “[t]he defendant used his or her position of trust, confidence, or 
fiduciary responsibility to facilitate the commission of the current offense”); CAL. R. CT. 
4.421(a)(11) (noting as an aggravating sentencing factor the fact that “[t]he defendant took 
advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense”); Bisard v. Indiana, 26 
N.E.3d 1060, 1067 (2015) (finding as aggravating sentencing factor that defendant abused his 
position of trust as police officer); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (“Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill”); Alexa P. 
Freeman, Unscheduled Departures: The Circumvention of Just Sentencing for Police Brutality, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 677, 681 (1996) (discussing police abuse of trust as aggravating sentencing factor 
under federal guidelines). 
BEDI IN PP (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2017  7:08 PM 
94  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:79 
trust in committing the assault or homicide. This is similar to other 
aggravating circumstances such as the vulnerability of the victim or age 
of the victim.72 
Ostensibly, the presence of this abuse-of-trust sentencing factor 
may suggest that there is no need to amend the current statutory 
framework along the lines I propose. Police officers can indeed receive 
an enhancement, only it occurs at sentencing and not during the guilt-
or-innocence phase. There are two problems with this line of 
reasoning. For one thing, it seems that judges in their discretion do not 
currently do enough with this potential aggravating factor to mete out 
strong sentences that would make up for the asymmetry during the 
guilt-or-innocence phase.73 Second, and more importantly, even if they 
did, for the reasons discussed in this Essay it is nonetheless imperative 
that the statutory liability framework—not the resultant sanction for a 
crime—reflect a consistent message to the community.74 Put 
differently, “making specific behavior a crime is what communicates 
social reprobation, not the sentencing of that crime.”75 
In order to achieve statutory parity through this avenue of reform, 
states would have to repeal the current aggravated assault statutes that 
currently only apply to harm against police officers.76 Sentencing then 
would be the only place where the status of the victim—as citizen or 
police officer—would be relevant. 
It may be easier, and more politically palatable, to amend the 
current aggravated statutes to add those crimes committed by police 
officers during the performance of their duties rather than repeal the 
current laws. For instance, states could pass a statute called “assault by 
a police officer” that would be a mirror image of the aggravated assault 
charge that currently only applies to citizens harming officers. This 
 
 72. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3.2(a)(8) (2015) (“[T]he defendant committed the offense 
against a person 60 years of age or older or such person’s property[.]”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9.94A.535(3)(b) (“The defendant knew or should have known that the victim of the current 
offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance.”); CAL. R. CT. 4.421(a)(3) (“The 
victim was particularly vulnerable[.]”); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(b)(1) 
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (increasing sentencing level if the victim was vulnerable). 
 73. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 71, at 727–28 (citing cases and discussing the problem of 
weak sentences for officers convicted of police abuses). 
 74. See id. at 715 (citing H.L.A. Hart’s argument that distinguishes “between the primary 
objective of the law in encouraging or discouraging certain kinds of behavior, and its merely 
ancillary sanction or remedial steps”). 
 75. See id. (citing H.L.A. Hart’s theory). 
 76. This change may also adversely impact a state’s ability to sufficiently deter harm against 
police officers in the performance their public duties. See infra Part I.B. 
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time, police officers too would automatically receive an enhanced 
charge if they unlawfully harm a citizen during an official encounter. 
This type of addition to the statutory framework also sends a uniform 
message that crimes involving police officers are unique and more 
damaging to society than crimes between private citizens. 
As it stands, the current asymmetry only contributes to what 
appears to be a low point in American confidence in police authority.77 
Minority populations appear even less trustworthy of the police and 
their ability to enforce laws uniformly.78 While my proposal does not 
directly address the issue of disproportionate police treatment of 
certain sectors of the population, it can still help foster greater 
confidence in police accountability. 
The push to amend relevant statutes will signal to the community 
that states take police abuse seriously—just as seriously as harm to 
officers.  It is important that laws reflect our culture and vice versa. 
More specifically, this kind of messaging may encourage more 
individuals to be part of community-policing-based initiatives. These 
initiatives, broadly speaking, seek to increase involvement of local 
community members with law enforcement personnel to formulate 
relevant polices and partnerships in order to foster greater trust 
between both groups.79 Individuals may feel more invested in 
participating in these initiatives if they feel that harm by and against 
officers is treated equally. 
This messaging also can directly impact how police officers carry 
out their functions. Aggravated statutes may help in reducing police 
abuses. It is true that officers are already subject to assault or homicide 
charges for acts of excessive force. However, the threat of enhanced 
criminal liability may push police officers to be more careful or 
judicious when exercising force and deadly force. A recent study 
 
 77. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Confidence in Police Lowest in 22 Years, GALLUP 
(June 19, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/183704/confidence-police-lowest-years.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/D5ZE-RLGB] (noting that police trust is at a low point). 
 78. See, e.g., Julie Hirschfield Davis, Obama Warns of Growing Mistrust Between Minorities 
and Police, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/us/politics/tensions-
flare-at-obamas-town-hall-on-race-and-police.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2D67-WRHN]; Jones, 
supra note 77; see also Sendhill Mullainathan, Police Killings of Blacks: Here Is What the Data 
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/18/upshot/police-killings-of-
blacks-what-the-data-says.html [https://perma.cc/E6VE-KCYR] (discussing how African 
Americans are disproportionately killed by police officers). 
 79. See generally Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: 
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997) (discussing theoretical 
underpinnings, history, and practical benefits of community-based police initiatives). 
BEDI IN PP (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2017  7:08 PM 
96  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:79 
confirms that greater scrutiny of police conduct promotes better 
behavior and reduces the likelihood of police abuses, which in turn can 
save lives.80 This kind of change can ultimately help instill more faith in 
police authority and greater support for police officers generally. 
Changing laws is only half the battle; prosecutors must still bring 
these aggravated charges. Because these individuals work closely with 
officers, they may not have the motivation to prosecute them.81 Given 
the nature of their relationship, prosecutors will always deal with 
institutional or other pressures not to bring charges against officers.82 
My proposal does not fundamentally change this institutional 
structure. That said, this kind of reform could promote more 
prosecutions. The insertion of reciprocal aggravated statutes could 
help prosecutors internalize the importance of curtailing abuses, which 
may, in turn, prompt them to submit more charges. Or public pressure 
in light of this kind of reform will make it harder for prosecutors to 
justify not bringing charges. 
These reforms are still worthwhile even if they do not materially 
alter the rates at which prosecutors charge officers. Beyond the 
benefits of uniform messaging described above, aggravated statutes 
can still change police behavior because they carry more severe 
punishment and thus will have a greater deterrent effect than the 
current set of laws, even if officers are not prosecuted in higher 
numbers as a result of these statutes.83 
My proposal not only can improve how police officers interact 
with citizens but also may positively impact how they judge their fellow 
police officers. Specifically, my proposal may reduce the likelihood of 
police officers failing to disclose unlawful conduct committed by fellow 
 
 80. Cf. Michael D. White, Henry F. Fradella, Weston J. Morrow & Doug Mellom, Federal 
Civil Litigation as an Instrument of Police Reform: A Natural Experiment Exploring the Effects of 
the Floyd Ruling on Stop-And-Frisk Activities in New York City, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 62–64 
(2016) (finding positive effects of greater police scrutiny in the form of federal civil litigation). 
 81. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437, 
443 (“Prosecutors, for example, have authority to prosecute law enforcement officers for criminal 
misconduct, but their motivation to do so may be compromised by their desire to maintain 
positive relationships . . . .”); David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 499 (1992) (“[P]rosecutors do not like prosecuting fellow law 
enforcement officers (with whom they work on a day-to-day basis) . . . .”). 
 82. See supra note 81. 
 83. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the 
Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1544 (1974) (noting that under 
deterrence theory model, “more severe sanctions yield greater deterrence, other things 
being equal”). 
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officers. The “police ‘code of silence’” phenomenon refers to “the 
refusal of a police officer to ‘rat’ on fellow officers, even if the officer 
has knowledge of wrongdoing or misconduct.”84 An aggravated statute 
sends the message to officers that crimes by their fellow officers are 
equally problematic as abuses against their fellow colleagues. 
Internalizing this kind of messaging may motivate more officers to 
speak out against colleagues when they cross the line. 
CONCLUSION 
The focus here has been on how aggravated charges can send a 
uniform message to the community and ultimately promote better 
police practices. As a society, we need to foster an atmosphere of equal 
accountability for citizens and officers—a message that can help 
restore confidence in police authority. This kind of reform is 
particularly important in light of the current concerns over police 
misconduct. 
My proposal, though, also will help police officers directly. The 
current asymmetrical messaging, together with instances of excessive 
force, do nothing to cultivate an appreciation for the risks officers take 
in protecting the community. A symmetrical system may ultimately put 
the focus where it squarely belongs: the sacrifices that officers make in 
the line of duty and the debt we as a society owe them. 
 
 
 84. Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 1983 
Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 63–64 (2000). “The police ‘code of silence’ is a well-
documented phenomenon” in the scholarly literature. See id. at 63 & n.202. 
